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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Department of Justice has declared
health care fraud the nation's number one white collar crime
priority.' The rationale for this, originally expressed by Willie
1.

See Kevin J. Darken, Understandingthe New Health Care FraudLegislation,
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Sutton in reference to robbing banks and often quoted by white
collar crime professor Pamela Bucy, is "because that's where the
money is."2 The delivery of health care will soon cost American
citizens in excess of 1.4 trillion dollars annually, or
approximately 15% of the gross national product. 3 The General
Accounting Office estimates that fraud and abuse accounts for
10% of these expenditures, or 140 billion dollars per year
translating to 384 million dollars per day.4 The recovery of over
1.5 billion dollars in Medicare fraud by the federal government
in the last three years 5 and the fact that the state of Montana
recouped 1.1 million dollars in Medicare/Medicaid fraud in 1998
supports this estimate and highlights the problem even in a
6
rural state such as Montana.
Health care fraud has existed since the dawn of medical
care as unscrupulous physicians duped patients into paying for
"snake oil" cures.7
However, early health care was not
sufficiently lucrative to stimulate significant fraud schemes and
most crimes by dishonest physicians were more direct in
nature.8 In the early twentieth century this began to change.
World War I stimulated a rapid advance in the science of
medicine, post war industrialization improved access to

CRIM. JUST., Fall 1997, at 30, 30.
2. See, e.g., PAMELA H. BUCY ET AL., HEALTH CARE FRAUD: CRIMINAL, CIVIL AND
ADMIIsTRATIvE LAW § 1.01, at 1-3 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1999); Pamela H. Bucy, Crimes
by Health Care Providers, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 589, 589 (1996); and PAMELA H. BucY,
WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 758 (2-d ed. 1998).
3. See PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CONGRESS at 12 (March 1996) (predicted yearly expenditures
for health care will exceed 1.4 trillion dollars by the year 2000).
4. See Alwyn Cassill, Cop: Federal Fraud Police Yourself or We'll Get You, AM.
HoSP. ASSN. NEWS, Feb. 3, 1997, at 1. See also MALCOLM K SPARROW, LICENSE TO
STEAL: WHY FRAUD PLAGUES AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 2 (1996). This figure is
only an estimate by the Government Accounting Office and in reality has no basis in
fact. Losses could be significantly higher or lower but until they are carefully measured,
10% seems the politically acceptable figure.
5. See Jack A. Rovner, Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control After HIPAA, 9
HEALTH LAW 17, 17 (1997) (citing 2 HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. 2 (Mar. 5, 1997)).
6. See interview with Leif Johnson, Assistant United States Attorney, in
Missoula, Mont. (Apr. 2, 1999).
7. These early fraudfeasors concocted evil tasting mixtures of opium and alcohol
which did little to cure patients but did render them both apathetic to their disease and
addicted.
8. See PAMELA H. BUCY ET AL., HEALTH CARE FRAUD: CRIMINAL, CIvIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 1.02, at 1-7 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1999). Professor Bucy points out
that in the early years, there was little money to be made in medicine and little demand
for medical care. This forced physicians to have other jobs, some of which were criminal.
For example, there is the case of a physician who moonlighted as a highwayman.
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hospitals and the Great Depression stimulated the development
of medical insurance. 9 This resulted in an enormous influx of
money into the health care system and set the stage for the
modern health care fraud industry.
In 1996, amid reports of increasing Medicare and Medicaid
fraud and abuse as well as increasing concern about the longterm financial viability of Medicare and Medicaid, Congress
"caught health insurance reform fever and passed, with near
unanimity, the Kassebaum-Kennedy Bill." 1o This bill became
known as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996,11 or HIPAA. HIPAA is an extraordinarily broad law
which, in addition to its own provisions, amended the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, (ERISA), 12 the Public
Health Service Act, (PHS),13 and the Internal Revenue Code. 14
HIPAA was initially to function as a remedy for loss of private
health insurance due to employment changes. However, a more
broad interpretation ensued, and HIPAA became the first
federal statute to regulate private health care and dramatically
increase the government's ability power to prosecute and punish
health care fraud.
This paper will explore the potential effects of the HIPAA on
existing health care fraud law in Montana. In order to properly
understand the impact of this new legislation, the reader must
have a basic understanding of current health care law. Part II
of this paper discusses the history and background of health
care fraud and abuse law. Part III outlines the background and
purposes of HIPAA. Part IV elaborates on Title II of HIPAA, the
core of its anti-fraud provisions. Part V is a summary of
interviews with the Medicaid Fraud Division of Montana's
Department of Health and Human Services and the Deputy U.S.
Attorney responsible for prosecuting Medicare fraud in
Montana. Part VI is an analysis of a few cases that have been
reported under HIPAA and Part VII speculates on the effects of
9. See Bucy, supra note 8, § 1.02, at 1-8.
10. See Jack A. Rovner, Federal Regulation Comes to Private Health Care
Financing: The Group Health Insurance Provisions of the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996, 7 ANN. HEALTH L. 183, 183 (1997).
11i See Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
12. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1181
(1994).
13. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-299 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg41 (1994).
14. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9806 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 9801
(1994).
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HIPAA likely to evolve over the next few years. Part VIII offers
a final critique of HIPAA's inadequacies.
II. THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF HEALTH CARE FRAUD
AND ABUSE LAW
Prior to World War I, most patients paid their medical bills
personally and directly to their health care provider. In the
agrarian, pre-industrialized United States, this was sometimes
accomplished through barter of goods or services. However, as
America industrialized and populations concentrated, the
concept of health insurance developed both as a way to share the
cost of injury and as a way to attract physicians to the
expanding, but somewhat undesirable, West by guaranteeing
them a livable income.
Early medical insurance consisted primarily of Blue
Cross/Blue Shield and a few other private insurers which
provided hospital and physician payments. 15 This type of
insurance primarily covered the working middle class and did
offer some opportunity for fraud through charging for services
not provided. 16 However, this particular type of fraud was a civil
matter litigated between the private third party insurers and
the physician providers, a matter thought best handled by the
state courts.
Health care fraud became a federal issue in 1965 when
social concerns over inequitable distribution of health insurance
prompted the government to expand its role in health care and
create Medicaid and Medicare. 17 Medicare was constructed
following the Blue Cross/Blue Shield model with fee for service
reimbursement by a third party payer mechanism. Part A of
Medicare mimicked Blue Cross paying for hospitalization and
Part B emulated Blue Shield paying for physician services.
Within 30 years, Medicare and Medicaid were paying nearly half
8
of all health care costs in the United States.
15. See ROBERT CUNNINGHAM III & ROBERT CUNNINGHAM JR., THE BLUES: A
HISTORY OF THE BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD SYSTEM (1997) (describing the rise of

Blue Cross in 1929 as a teacher's hospital insurance plan at Baylor University and the
rise of Blue Shield shortly thereafter as a plan which started in the mining and lumber

camps of the Pacific Northwest to pay physicians a guaranteed monthly fee in order to
induce them to come to the camps).

16. See id.
17. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33 (1994)).
18. See
PROSPECTIVE
PAYMENT
ASSESSMENT
RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS at 7 (June 1994).
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A. The Medicareand Medicaid Systems EncourageFraud
The fact that Medicare emulated the Blue Cross model is
important for two reasons. First, it emphasizes the strength of
the health care industry lobby in Washington, D.C. and second it
set the stage for modem health care fraud. In the early 1960s,
the primary alternative to Medicare and Medicaid was
nationalization of the health care system. In 1965 the powerful
lobbying efforts of the American Medical Association, American
Hospital Association, American Pharmaceutical Association and
others managed to forge a compromise between full
nationalization and the existing privatized system by submitting
to a marked increase in government control of the medical
marketplace. This compromise made the government the
primary insurer for a large segment of the population and thus a
direct plaintiff in any civil fraud case.
Applying the Blue Cross model to Medicare and Medicaid
set the stage for the escalation of health care fraud because the
fee for service system of Blue Cross lacked anti-fraud
mechanisms. Professor Bucy emphasizes this fact in her white
collar crime treatise with eloquent simplicity when she states,
"the way you pay people affects the way they cheat." 19 She goes
on to point out that from an anti-fraud perspective, the fee for
service reimbursement provisions of Medicare and Medicaid are
a disaster. 20 Under an unlimited fee for service arrangement,
the more services a physician delivers, the more she gets paid
from the deep pocket of the federal government. 21 This
encourages four types of fraud: 1) billing for services not
provided; 2) billing for a service more expensive than that
actually provided; 3) billing for unnecessary services; 4) paying
kickbacks for referrals. 22 The first three types of fraud are easy
to accomplish and hard to detect

23

in a setting where legitimate

services are provided in a confidential milieu at a high volume,
the provision of services may be difficult to verify on subsequent
19. Bucy, supranote 8, § 1.03, at 1-21.
20. See id.
21. See James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health
Care Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 205, 207-209
(1996).
22. See Pamela H. Bucy et al., Fraudby Fright:White CollarCrime by Health Care
Providers, 67 N.C. L. REV. 855, 933 (1989).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Mekian, 505 F. 2d 1320 (5 th Cir. 1975) (physician
billed Medicare for compensable steroid joint injections to relieve joint pain when in
reality he gave routine intramuscular vitamin injections).
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examination, and patients often fail to remember the exact
technical details of services rendered. Compounding this is the
fact that Medicare is usually billed directly by the health care
provider so the patient is unaware of the precise services billed.
The scenario is further complicated by the subjective nature of
the medical profession in which providers may not agree that a
particular treatment is necessary. Kickbacks are likewise
difficult to detect because they occur between a small number of
interrelated providers and may easily be disguised as legitimate
24
referrals.
As fraud in the Medicare/Medicaid system is a simple and
lucrative crime to commit and is difficult and expensive to
detect, the most important conclusion that follows is health care
fraud is unlikely to disappear without a major change in how
health care is delivered. Statutes like HIPAA are merely stop
gap measures in an attempt to make the penalty for health care
fraud exceed the gains of the fraudulent conduct. This penalty
driven system, fortified by HIPAA, is no more likely to be
effective in the health care field than it has been in the war on
drugs.
B. Health CareFraudis Proscribedby a Hybrid of
Administrative, Civil and CriminalLaw
An important issue in prosecuting white collar crime is
determining when a particular behavior becomes criminal in
nature. In most infractions, the more blameworthy the actor,
the more likely the state is to intervene with criminal sanctions.
In areas of white collar crime such as such as environmental
crimes or money laundering, criminal prosecution is used
because the magnitude and deterrent effects of criminal
consequences exceed that of civil or administrative penalties.2
However, this is less true in the area of fraud in general and
health care fraud in particular.
Historically, about one third of health care fraud has been
prosecuted by state governments and two thirds by the federal
government. 26 Prosecutions may proceed administratively,

24.

For example, a surgeon might maintain a sailboat in the Bahamas that he

makes available to his "friends" who just happen to be the internists who refer patients
to him.
25. See James M. Strock, Environmental Criminal Enforcement Prioritiesfor the
1990s, 59 GEo.'WASH. L. REv. 916, 922 (1991).
26. See Bucy, supra note 22, at 883.
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civilly, or criminally. Although Medicare and Medicaid statutes
specifically prohibit health care fraud, most prosecutions have
proceeded under the general fraud statutes. 27 The reason for
this is unclear. There is considerable overlap between the
specific Medicare/Medicaid fraud statutes and the tried and true
general fraud statutes. Most likely, prosecutors prefer general
fraud statutes because of their familiarity to investigators,
courts and jurors, and because there is well established case law
precedent interpreting these laws. In prosecuting health care
fraud crimes, the state and federal government have four
primary goals in mind: 1) protect the patients; 2) recover funds
fraudulently obtained by unscrupulous providers; 3) deter repeat
conduct by the offender; and 4) deter similar conduct by other
offenders. 28
White collar crime scholars Albert Reiss and Albert
Biderman state that in the area of fraud, a clear line dividing a
civil from a criminal case based on defendant culpability or
seriousness of the sanctions ultimately imposed is impossible to
define. 29 The law of health care fraud exemplifies this dilemma.
For any given behavior, there are usually three overlapping sets
of causes of action and remedies from which to choose: 1)
administrative actions and remedies which are generally not
public unless appealed; 2) civil actions and sanctions which are a
public proceeding with financial consequences often as dire as
the criminal sanctions; and 3) criminal prosecution and
punishment which includes incarceration as well as fines.
i. Administrative Causes of Action and Remedies
Administrative causes of action are subject to the rules
promulgated by Health and Human Services and state Medicaid
boards and change literally daily. These actions are subject to
administrative due process as outlined by the Administrative
Procedures Act 30 and are used primarily to bring individual
providers into compliance with procedures in order to best
monitor their claims for fraudulent activity.
A lengthy
discussion of administrative actions is beyond the scope of this
paper.
Common administrative remedies in health care fraud
27.

See Bucy, supra note 8, § 3.01, at 3-3.

28.
29.
30.

See generally Bucy, supra note 22, Parts II and III, at 870-937.
See Bucy, supra note 8, § 1.04, at n.1.
See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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include actions to recover improperly obtained money, actions to
exclude provider participation in Medicare and Medicaid
programs and actions to revoke a provider's professional license.
In health care fraud, the decisions about choice of remedy
are made at three levels: 1) the administrative agency
responsible for the program defrauded; 2) the investigating unit
responsible for developing the case; and 3) the prosecutor. The
administrative agency caseworkers have wide discretion
regarding the application of administrative sanctions or referral
of the case for further investigation. Generally caseworkers give
the provider the benefit of the doubt and simply recover the
money unless the provider continues an illegal practice after a
warning.
If the administrative agency refers a case for
investigation, the investigators also have discretion in deciding
the outcome of the case. If, after further examination, the
investigator feels there has been a misunderstanding between
provider and caseworker, he can refer the case back to the
agency. Alternatively, the investigator may refer the case to the
prosecutor who then exercises wide discretion in whether to
31
bring civil charges, criminal charges or both.
ii. Civil Causes of Action and Sanctions
Civil action is usually sufficient to recapture fraudulently
obtained funds and deter repeat conduct by the individual
offender. Civil prosecution is reserved for those instances when
administrative actions are ineffective in deterring repeat
conduct or when the behavior is so blatant that it offends the
sensibilities of the casework administrator.
Any fraudulent claim for Medicare or Medicaid gives the
government a first party interest to prosecute the fraud civilly.
The most commonly used civil cause of action is pursuant to the
False Claims Act which is aimed at thwarting the "world's
second oldest profession ...stealing."32 Civil RICO 33 and money
laundering3 4 have also been commonly used. 35 The application
of asset forfeiture to health care fraud through RICO and money
laundering promoted federal and state interest in prosecuting
31. See discussion infra Parts II.B.(ii)-(iii).
32. Bucy, supra note 8, § 4.01, at n.1 (quoting Representative Bedell in the Cong.
Rec. H6483 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986)).
33. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(1994 & Supp. 1997).
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1994 & Supp. III 199.7).
35. See Bucy, supranote 8, § 4.01, at 4-3.
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health care fraud civilly.
In a civil case, not only is the burden of proof for conviction
lower, but sanctions can be more lucrative. Assets can be
forfeited in the absence of a conviction and the burden of
establishing the assets were procured legally falls to the
defendant. 36 Any of the provider's assets used in connection
with the alleged crime become subject to forfeiture including a
home, office building, bank accounts, etc. These facts combine to
make the pursuance of civil health care fraud an enticing
prospect for the government. Other civil sanctions include
damages for fraud based malpractice brought by patients, tort
and breach of contract lawsuits by private insurance companies
37
and statutory civil actions such as the False Claims Act.

iii. CriminalProsecutionand Punishment
Criminal prosecution for health care fraud requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt. This level of proof is difficult to attain
due to the complexity of the statutes, enormity of the paperwork
involved and the strictness of the intent requirement. The
prosecutor makes the decision to prosecute based on three major
criteria: 1) the level of proof that the evidence supports
(preponderance of evidence oi beyond reasonable doubt); 2) the
degree of intent; and 3) the severity of damage to patients and
the program. Of these three criteria, sufficiency of evidence and
severity of damage are usually obvious by the time the
investigator hands the case to the prosecutor. Demonstration of
the requisite intent is often the most complex discretionary
38
decision the prosecutor faces.
Criminal prosecution is usually reserved for conduct that is
injurious to individuals, particularly flagrant, or to deter
similar conduct by other offenders. Federally, mail and wire
fraud have been the most common charges prosecuted because
nearly all health care fraud involves submission of claims either
electronically

or through the mail. 39

False claims, false

statements, and conspiracy make up most of the rest of the
charges although RICO, 4° money laundering, tax offenses, and
36. See generally PAMELA H. Bucy, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS
328-417 (2d. 1998).
37. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (1994).
38. See discussion infra Part C.
39. See discussion infra Part C.
40. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(1994).
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theft of government property have also been invoked. 41 The
state has traditionally employed state Medicaid fraud as its
primary criminal charge, but controlled substance offenses,
elder abuse crimes, larceny and conspiracy have also been
applied. 42 Criminal punishment may include fines, incarceration
and the loss of privileges of citizenship that follow felony
conviction.
Criminal health care fraud prosecutions have been
43
significantly impacted by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
These guidelines, enacted largely in response to drug and
firearm offenses, have markedly reduced judicial discretion in
dispensing justice in health law violations. The guidelines call
for fines of up to twenty-five thousand dollars and five years
imprisonment for each offense. 44 Since health care offenses often
stem from an improper billing procedure that has been repeated
for multiple patients, they are charged as multiple counts of the
same offense. 45 In health care violations with a minimal
scienter requirement, a competent and dedicated physician can
be at risk for many years of imprisonment and fines out of any
imaginable proportion to the alleged crime. 46

41. See Bucy, supra note 8, § 3.01, at 3-3 & 3-4. See also interview with Leif
Johnson, Asst. U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, in Billings, Mont. (April 2, 1999).
42. See See Bucy, supra note 8, § 3.01, at 3-3 & 3-4. See also interview with Leif
Johnson, Asst. U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, in Billings, Mont. (April 2, 1999);
Interview with Joan Ashley, Director, Montana Medicaid Surveillance Utilization
Review Service (SURS), in Helena, Mont. (Apr. 6, 1999).
43. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994). See
also Federal Sentencing Guidelines Act of 1986, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 994 (1994).
44. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b (Supp. III 1997) (outlining penalties for willful
and knowing violation of Medicare billing laws) (emphasis added).
45. See e.g. United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5 (D.D.C. 1994). A physician
whom the court described as "dedicated" and "competent" was charged with knowingly
presenting a false claim, knowingly presenting a false record, conspiracy to defraud the
government and unjust enrichment. The government requested treble actual damages of
$245,000 and penalties of $10,000 for each of 8,002 allegedly false reimbursement
claims.
The government claimed that the physician billed for a 45-minute
psychotherapy session instead of the proper 30- minute session. Id. at 6-11.
46. See id. Here, the physician was at risk for twenty- five years imprisonment
and more than 80 million dollars in fines because his billing clerk, his wife and a nonphysician, averaged the duration of the doctor's patient visits at sometimes 15 minutes
and sometimes two hours. Admittedly, this practice was wrong, but it surely did not
merit threats ofjail time and permanent financial ruin.
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C. The TraditionalIntent Requirement of
Health care Fraud
In health care fraud, like many white collar crimes, the
facts of a particular interaction are usually not at issue. There
are patient charts, detailed accounts of tests and billing records
which describe the conduct. More often, the issue of criminality
turns on intent of the provider.
The definition of intent varies with the statute invoked to
charge health care fraud. For example, the Criminal False
Claims Act requires that the defendant submit a false claim
"knowingly"47 but the False Statement Act requires that the
defendant "knowingly and willfully" 48 make a false statement.
Courts dealing with health care fraud have held, in keeping with
standard criminal jurisprudence, that the term "knowingly,"
does not require specific intent to commit a crime. 49 However, in
some criminal cases, particularly those involving complex
statutes, courts have interpreted knowingly in a liberal manner
in favor of the criminally accused by compelling the prosecution
to prove knowingly in each element of the crime. 50 An example
of this requirement occurs in Staples v. United States in which
the Court held the defendant must know not only that he
possesses a firearm but also that it is an automatic weapon,
each fact a separate element of the crime. 51 The policy behind
this interpretation is that a statutory crime carrying a
substantial penalty is presumed to require a defendant to know
52
the facts that make his conduct illegal.
An exemption to the general interpretation of knowingly is
called the "public welfare exception." This exception, sometimes
applied in environmental crimes, states that if the danger to the
public is sufficiently great, strict liability may be applied to

47. See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) (emphasis added).
49. United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 537-41 (2d. Cir. 1995).
50. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68-74 (1994).
51. 511 U.S. 600, 619-20 (1994).
52. See id. See also United States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F. 3d 1523, 1530 (9 th Cir.
1993), amended & superseded on denial of reh'g by 35 F. 3d 1275, 1285-89 (9th Cir. 1994)
and United States v. Ahmad, 101 F. 3d 386, 390-91 (5th Cir. 1996) (these two cases both
quoted United States v. Staples: Weitzenhoff to affirm that a mistake of law is not an
exception to the general rule that criminal behavior does not require specific intent and
Ahmad to affirm that knowingly applies to all elements of a crime and a mistake of fact
(believing gasoline discharge was actually water) does prevent criminal conviction).
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certain individuals. 53 For example, in CERCLA,5 4 an "owner" of
property may be held responsible for pollution on that property
even if he has no knowledge or control of that pollution.
In health care crimes, a court must balance the need to
prevent fraud against the obligation to protect individuals from
substantial punishment for inadvertent crimes.55 A health care
prosecutor might argue that the public welfare exception should
apply and the legal system should place the onus of acquiring
knowledge of fraudulent activity on the health care provider
because the consequences of health care fraud to society are
enormous and the provider is in the best position to monitor
fraudulent activity. The defense could counter by pointing out
that the complexity of the health care statutes makes
interpretation
by
individual
providers
treacherous.
Additionally, the severity of the penalties are such that it is
unfair to impose them without clear notice to the defendant of
56
his criminal behavior.
Whether a court would allow the public welfare exception
remains an open question. However, since the public welfare
exception has been ruled to be narrow and not applied to
machine guns,5 7 it is unlikely the United States Supreme Court
would condone its application to any but the most egregious
health care fraud. Its application would likely require physical
patient risk as well as individual and government financial
losses.
Adding the term "willfully" to a statute further complicates
the intent definition. Early on, in United States v. Greber, the
Third Circuit found that the term "willfully" did not mandate
specific intent to commit a crime.5 8 Rather, the defendant
merely had to intend his actions and to carry out those actions
willfully.5 9

However, several years later the United States

Supreme Court interpreted the terms "willfully" and the phrase
53. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
54. See id. at §§ 9601-75 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
55. See Andrea Tuwiner Vavonese, Comment, The Medicare Anti-Kickback
Provision of the Social Security Act-Is Ignorance of the Law an Excuse for Fraudulent
and Abusive Use of the System?, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 943, 976 (1996).
56. See supra notes 45 and 46.
57. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607-610 (1994).
58. 760 F.2d. 68, 71 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that if the effect of a business practice
was an inducement to refer patients, the Defendant violated the statute even if
legitimate services were performed for fair market value).
59. See id.
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"knowingly and willfully" to require specific intent to commit the
crime in tax (Cheek v. United States )60 and money laundering
(Ratzlaf v. United States)6 1 cases. In 1995, the Ninth Circuit
applied Ratzlaf and Cheek to health care fraud for the first time,
holding in Hanlester Network v. Shalala 2 that the element of
intent required the defendants to know that their conduct was
unlawful and to undertake that conduct with the specific intent
to commit the crime. 63 This decision created quite a stir in the
OIG's office which vowed to "aggressively contest" the
application of the Hanlesterstandard in other circuits."
Almost immediately, in United States v. Neufeld,65 a district
court in the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit. The
Neufeld Court held that the language in the money laundering
and tax statutes at issue in Ratzlaf and Cheek could be
distinguished as more vague than the language in the Medicare
anti-kickback statutes. It further held that the ambiguities of
conduct addressed in Ratzlaf were sufficiently innocent
compared to that of Neufeld in the Medicare setting and that the
prior Supreme Court holding that willfulness requires specific
intent need not apply in Medicare fraud.6 6 In 1996, the Eighth
Circuit also refused to follow Hanlester for similar reasons. 67
The Tenth Circuit has taken a somewhat intermediate stance in
United States v. Migliaccio, holding that the complex regulations
in health care fraud require the prosecution to prove that there
is no reasonable interpretation of the rules which could render a
68
defendant's statements truthful.
The Supreme Court has so far declined to address the issue
of "willfully" in the Medicare fraud context. 6 9 However, given its
jurisprudence in Ratzlaf and Cheek, it is likely that the Court
would apply the specific intent requirements it identified in

60. 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991).
61. 510 U.S. 135, 149(1994).
62. 51 F.3d 1390 (1995).
63. See id. at 1400.
64. See Department of Justice Refuses to Ask for Supreme Court Review of
HanlesterAnti-Kickback Case, 7 BNA MEDICARE REP. No. 6, Feb. 9, 1996, at 157.
65. 908 F. Supp. 491, 494-97 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
66. See id.
67. See United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 440-41 (8th Cir. 1996).
68. 34 F.3d 1517, 1524 (10th Cir. 1994).
69. See Barbara Yuill, High Court Justices' 1999-2000 Docket Currently Includes
Six Health Law Cases, 8 BNA HEALTH L. REP. NO. 6, Sept. 30, 1999, at 1573 (the
United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the Hanlester doctrine and has not
seen fit to add it to this year's docket).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol61/iss1/7

14

2000
(HIPAA)
ACTInsurance
OF 1996
Eddy: The Effect of the Health
Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996
those cases to health care fraud in all but the most egregious
fact circumstances.

III. THE BACKGROUND AND PURPOSES OF HIPAA
Shortly after his inauguration, President Bill Clinton
announced that health care reform was a top priority of his
administration 70 and promptly appointed his wife to accomplish7
this goal. Unfortunately, the Clinton's Health Security Act '
was couched in terms of "comprehensive federalization" which
the 1994 Republican Congress, the American Medical
Association, and the American Hospital Association rapidly
labeled "socialization of medicine" and thwarted. After the
flaming death of their Health Security Act, the Clintons were
able to keep public discontent with health insurance alive by
emphasizing the barrier of prior existing illness to continuous
Interestingly, the
health insurance when changing jobs.
Clintons accomplished this using the storytelling technique
conceived by critical legal theorists in the 1970s. 72 Critical legal
theory was executed brilliantly by Ruth Bader Ginsburg to sway
the Supreme Court to a position against gender discrimination
when she was director of the American Civil Liberties Union
Using the same strategy that
Women's Rights Project. 73
70. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Michael K. Frisby, Clinton Pledges That Crime and
Welfare Issues Will Get Near Equal Billing With Health Care, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1994,
at A16.
71. See H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993).
72. A detailed discussion of critical legal theory and its progeny critical race theory
and critical gender theory is beyond the scope of this paper. In general, critical legal
theorists deconstruct the central ideas of modern legal thought using a variety of
argument styles. One technique, employed predominantly by critical race and gender
theorists, is telling real life stories which emphasize the absurdity of the outcome of
traditional jurisprudence. Classic examples of this style are found in Lucie E. White,
Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes in FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 404 (Katharine T. Bartlett et al. eds., 1991) and
in Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound! in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOvEMENT 426 (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds. 1996). If the reader is
interested in a more general exposure to critical legal theory, see THE POLITICS OF LAw
In particular, see Robert W. Gordon, New
(David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990).
Developments in Legal Theory, in id. at 413. . See also James Boyle, The Politics of
Reason: CriticalLegal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685 (1985);
Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal
Scholarship,95 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1982); and Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical
Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 563 (1983).
73. See David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women's Rights in a
Man's World, 2 LAw & INEQ. J. 33, 53-58 (1984). This paper offers an in-depth analysis
of Ginsburg's use of incidents of discrimination against males to educate the United
States Supreme Court about the evils inherent in any type of gender discrimination,
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Ginsburg argued to the Supreme Court, the Clintons and their
democratic political machine convinced congress that the health
care system needed reformation by telling stories that resonated
with the conservative majority; stories of hardworking white
middle class folks who suffered bankruptcy, untreated illness
and even premature death through lack of health care
insurance. 74 This inflamed Congress sufficiently to pass the
Kassebaum-Kennedy Bill nearly unanimously and in September
of 1996, Clinton signed it into law. 75
HIPAA contains
approximately one third of the reforms originally proposed by
the Clintons in their Health Security Act couched in less
aggressive terms. 76 The broad purpose of HIPAA is stated in the
Act itself and provides that HIPAA is:
[an Act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to improve
portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in group
and individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in
health insurance and health care delivery, to promote the use of
medical savings accounts, to improve access to long-term care
services and coverage, to simplify the administration of health
77
insurance, and for other purposes.
Thus HIPAA, a statute that was originally billed primarily
as a remedy for loss of private health insurance due to
employment changes, became the first federal statute to
regulate private health care and markedly increased the
government's power to prosecute health care fraud. On the first
anniversary of its passage, Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of
Health and Human Services announced:
This anniversary marks the enactment of landmark legislation
that has given millions of working people the comfort of knowing
that if they change jobs, they need not lose their health insurance.
This is an important step that demonstrates our commitment to
improve access to high quality health care for all Americans. This
supporting her arguments concerning discrimination against women. See also Ruth
Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1975) and Ruth Ginsburg,
Sex and UnequalProtection:Men and Women as Victims, 11 J. FAM. L. 347 (1971) for her
own specific examples.
74. See, e.g., Rick Wartzman, Advertising War Over Health Reform Heats Up, With

Confused Americans Caught in Crossfire, WAL ST. J., July 15, 1994, at A14; Hilary
Stout, Insurers'Harryand Louise CampaignReturns to TV to Cut Up HealthPlan, WALL
ST. J., June 21, 1994, at A24; and Michael Wines & Robert Pear, President Finds
Benefits in Defeat on Health Care, N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 1996, at A4.
75. See Rovner, supra note 10, at 183.
76. See
Health Hippo:
HIPAA
Page
(visited Feb.
5,
2000)
<http-/hippo.findlaw.com/hipaa.htm>.
77. Health Insurance Portablility and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936, 1936.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol61/iss1/7

16

2000
ACTInsurance
OF 1996
(HIPAA)
Eddy: The Effect of the Health
Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996
legislation provides that a woman with a sick child can move from

one group plan to another without a lapse in health insurance, and
without paying more than other employees for that coverage. And
it gives small businesses access to health insurance programs to
provide their employees with the coverage they need and deserve.
In addition to providing health care portability, this legislation
created a stable source of funding for fraud control activities, and
is giving us new resources to attack fraudulent health care
providers, and develop new management tools and techniques.
Funded by these critical resources, today I was pleased to award
more than $2.25 million in grants 78for new programs that will
strengthen our ongoing fraud efforts.

Contrary to these accolades the circuitous conception and
birth of HIPAA has rendered it disjointed and prompted scholars
to criticize it as "somewhat schizophrenic." 79 HIPAA is divided
into five separate sections with little tying them together. Title
I addresses health care access, portability and renewability;
Title II deals with health care fraud; Title III creates medical
savings accounts and speaks to long term medical care,
consumer protection and organ transplantation efforts; Title IV
regulates private group health insurance plans; and Title V
amends the Tax Code in the area of revenue offsets. This paper
will focus on the Title II health care fraud provisions.
IV. TITLE II OF HIPAA
Title II of HIPAA is the substance of the government's
attack on health care fraud. It outlines four approaches to
controlling fraud and abuse: 1) education; 2) broadening the
definition of health care fraud; 3) enhancement of health care
fraud enforcement; and 4) expansion of penalties for health care
fraud.
A. Provisions to Educate Providers,Payers and the PublicAbout
Health Care Fraud
One of the theories regarding the prevalence of health care
fraud is that the rules are so complex that providers simply
cannot determine whether or not a given practice is permitted.
To address this problem, drafters of HIPAA decided to educate

78. See
Health
Hippo:
HIPAA
Page
(visited
Feb.
5,
2000)
<http:/hippo.findlaw.con/hipaa.html.> (quoting Donna Shalala's comments when
HIPAA was signed into law).
79. Katherine Benesch, Health Care Fraud Criminalization Growing, 7 N.J. LAW.
1422 (1998).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2000

17

192

LAW
REVIEW
Montana MONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
61 [2000],
Iss. 1, Art. 7

Vol. 62

all parties involved in health care transactions. Underlying this
approach was the hope that it would not only clarify fraudulent
behavior to the providers but also convert payers and recipients
into a network of fraud surveillance.
i. Office of the Inspector GeneralAdvisory Opinions
Provisions forbidding kickbacks and self-referrals have been
some of the most complex areas of health care law. Amid federal
anti-kickback statutes,8 0 the Stark Amendments, 8 ' and antitrust
law, business arrangements between hospitals, physicians,
laboratories, surgical centers and other health care agencies
have become minefields of potential criminal liability. HIPAA
authorized the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to issue
advisory opinions regarding the legality of specific transactions
between February 21, 1997 and August 21, 2000.82 These
opinions are limited to the parties to a transaction and the
following four questions: 1) whether a transaction constitutes
prohibited remuneration; 2) whether a transaction complies
with exceptions or safe harbors; 3) whether a transaction
constitutes an inducement to limit services to beneficiaries; and
4) whether a transaction is grounds for civil or criminal
sanctions. The OIG must issue a requested opinion within sixty
days and that opinion is binding on the OIG and the parties but
may not be used as precedent by other parties. The requesting
party must pay all costs as well as a request fee of $250.
OIG opinions have been requested in much lower numbers
than anticipated.8 3 One reason for this is that all information
submitted to the OIG becomes public information and many
providers opt to pay their own lawyers to research the questions
and retain their privacy. Another reason may be controversy
regarding whether the Department of Justice and Internal

80. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (Supp. III 1997).
81. Pub. L. No. 101-239 took effect in 1992 and is known as the Stark I
Amendment.
It specifically prohibits referral of Medicare patients to medical
laboratories in which a physician has an ownership interest and requires reporting of
ownership information and referral arrangements. Pub. L. No. 103-66 took effect in
1993 and is known as the Stark II amendment. It broadened the coverage of Stark I to
include Medicaid patients and prohibited ten other categories of referrals in addition to
medical laboratories.
82. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 205(b)(6), 110 Stat. 1936, 2002 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)(6) (Supp
III 1997)).
83. See Rovner, supra note 5, at 18.
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Revenue Service are bound by OIG opinions.84
ii. Safe Harborsand Special FraudAlerts
The federal anti-kickback statute already contained six
statutory exceptions known as "safe harbor" rules which
85
exempted certain remunerative practices from prosecution.
For example, Greber interpreted the antikickback provisions of
the Medicare Act quite narrowly. 86 However, the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), by administrative rule,
defined
as
legal
certain
hospital/physician
business
relationships which would not have survived a Greber standard
of review.81 Examples of this these practices include leasing of
office space, equipment rental, or even direct payments to
physicians. These practices will clearly tend to induce referrals.
However, if they are constructed in strict compliance with the
standards outlined by HHS, they will survive scrutiny.
HIPAA authorized one additional exception for risk sharing
between managed care organizations and providers.8 8 Also,
HIPAA authorized the OIG to develop and publish safe harbor
rules to guide various health care providers in their business
dealings.8 9 Additionally, the OIG is required to annually solicit
proposals from the public (including health care providers) for
modifying existing safe harbor rules or establishing new ones.9 0
In considering a safe harbor, HIPAA lists ten factors the OIG
must evaluate including patient access to health care, freedom
of patient choice of provider, provider incentives to order goods
or make referrals, competition, quality of care delivered, and
program cost. 91 The OIG uses standard notice and comment
rulemaking procedures to comply with these mandates.
Special fraud alerts are the opposite of safe harbors and
provide notice to the public and health care providers of

84. See Darken, supra note 1, at 32.
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (Supp. I1 1997).
86. See United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 71 (3r Cir. 1985).
87. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG AntiKickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952 (1991)(codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
88. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 216(b), 110 Stat. 1936, 2007 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) note).
89. See id. § 205(a), 110 Stat. at 2000 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(a) (Supp.
III 1997)).
90. See id. § 205(a), 110 Stat. at 2001 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(a) (Supp.
III 1997)).
91.

See id.
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practices that constitute fraud per se, much like the "per se
rules" of anti-trust law. 92 The most recent example of a
significant special fraud alert is the OIG's advisory bulletin on
gainsharing issued in July, 1999. 93 This document effectively
prohibited any form of patient care related gainsharing, a
practice which had up until that time been widely used to align
94
the financial incentives of hospitals and their staff physicians.
Like safe harbors, these alerts can be issued by the OIG of
its own accord or can be requested by any member of the
public.9 5 HIPAA requires the OIG to use the same factors and
the notice and comment rulemaking procedure for fraud alerts
96
as it does for safe harbor provisions.
iii. Explanationof MedicareBenefits
HIPAA requires that every Medicare patient receive an
Explanations of Medicare Benefits (EOMB) for every Medicare
covered item or service. EOMBs have turned out to be a fertile
source for patient reporting of possible fraudulent billing
practices. 97 This process has encouraged patients to review the
benefits they have received and provides a convenient
98
mechanism and financial incentive for reporting discrepancies.
iv. NationalData Bank
HIPAA mandates that HHS establish a national data bank
that records information about providers who commit fraud and
abuse. 99 The data required includes not only the entity
committing the fraudulent act but the officers and owners of the
92. See id. § 205(c), 110 Stat. at 2003 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(c) (Supp. III
1997)).
93. OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements and CMPs for
Hospital Payments to Physicians to Reduce or Limit Services to Beneficiaries, 64 Fed.
Reg. 37,985, 37,987 (1999).
94. In response to the OIG's ruling, one Dallas law firm complained that it had
over a hundred (now illegal) gainsharing arrangements in place for its clients. See
Katherine E. Harris & Barbara Yuill, Gainsharing: IG Bulletin Strikes Down
Gainsharing,Says CMP Law Bans Incentives To Curb Care, 8 BNA HEALTH L. REP.
1133 (July 15, 1999).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 203(a), 110 Stat. 1936, 1998.
98. See id.
99. See id. § 221(a), 110 Stat. at 2009 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7e(a) (Supp.
III 1997)).
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entity, any affiliate entities, the nature of the acts and any
injury stemming from the acts. 1°° Only final adverse actions are
reportable, but these include any final adverse administrative,
civil or criminal action and any licensure revocation. 10 1
Malpractice claims or settlements are not reported to the fraud
data bank but are reported to a separate data bank, the
National Practitioner Data Bank created by the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act of 1986.102
B. Provisionsto Extend the Definition of Health Care Fraud
HIPAA defined "health care fraud" as an independent
federal crime protecting federal, state and, for the first time,
private health care plans. 10 3 The criminal section of Title II of
HIPAA creates five new federal crimes. 1°4 In addition, HIPAA
expanded the existing money laundering, asset forfeiture and
fraud injunction statutes to cover "federal health care offenses"
and defined that term very broadly to include virtually any
illegal act touching any health benefit program, public or
private. 0 5
i. Specific New Federal Crimes
06
HIPAA defines four new felonies and a misdemeanor.
The felonies significantly broaden the definition of the health
care offenses by removing specific limitations present in other
federal criminal statutes. 0 7 Section 242(a) of HIPAA makes
health care fraud generally a crime. It prohibits knowingly and
willfully executing or attempting to execute a scheme to defraud
any health care benefit program or to fraudulently obtain money
or property from such programs in connection with the delivery
of or payment for health care benefits, items, or services. 0 8 This

100. See id. § 221(b), 110 Stat. at 2009 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7e(b) (Supp.
III 1997)).
101. See id.
102. See id.; See also 42 U.S.C. § 11101-11152 (1994).
103. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, §§ 241-47; 249, 110 Stat. 1936, 2016-21.
104. See id.
105. See 18 U.S.C. § 24 (Supp. III 1997); 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (Supp. III 1997); 18
U.S.C. § 982 (Supp. III 1997); and 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (Supp. III 1997).
106. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 §§ 24147,
249, 110 Stat. at 2016-21.
107. See Bucy, supra note 8, § 3.01, at 3-3.
108. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 242, 110
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offense is patterned after the bank fraud statute. 0 9 Under this
new offense however, federal prosecutors may indict an entire
health care fraud scheme including entities, individuals,
managers, and co-conspirators, without first tying it to
traditional conspiracy or mail fraud or wire fraud statutes. 110
This simplifies the charging and conviction of complex health
care fraud because it reduces the number of elements a
prosecutor must prove to make her case. Additionally, HIPAA
allows prosecution of fraudulent intrastate electronic billings to
private insurers, which could not have been prosecuted under
the wire fraud statutes."'
Section 243(a) of HIPAA makes theft or embezzlement in
connection with health care a federal crime. 112 No person or
steal,
entity may knowingly and willfully embezzle,
intentionally misapply, or otherwise convert any of the money,
property, premiums, or other assets of a health care benefit
program. There is no statutory minimum amount, so federal
prosecutors may now charge thefts or embezzlements which do
not meet the previously existing jurisdictional requirements of
$5,000 or more from an entity receiving more than $10,000 of
federal funds per year. 113 This statute law also allows federal
prosecutions of embezzlements from private health insurance
4
plans."l
False statements relating to health care matters are made a
federal crime by section 244(a) of HIPAA. 115 This includes both
false statements to the government which could be prosecuted
under the existing statute 1 6 and false statements made to
private insurers which could not be prosecuted. This statute
also contains the knowingly and willfully scienter requirement
and specifically prohibits falsifying, concealing, or covering up a
material fact by any trick, scheme, or device; making any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or
Stat. at
109.
110.
2016.
111.
112.
113.
114.
Stat. at
115.
1997)).
116.

2016 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (Supp. 1I1997)).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1344; See also Darken, supra note 1, at 31.
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act § 242, 110 Stat. at
See id.
See id. § 243(a), 110 Stat. at 2019 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 669 (Supp. III 1997)).
See 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 243, 110
2017.
See id. § 244(a), 110 Stat. at 2017 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1035 (Supp. III
See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. III 1997).
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representations; or making or using any materially false
document, knowing it contains any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or entry, in connection with the delivery of
117
or payment for health care benefits, items, or services.
It is now a crime, pursuant to section 245(a) of HIPAA, to
willfully attempt to or actually obstruct, prevent, mislead, or
delay, the communication of information or records relating to a
violation of a federal health care offense to a criminal
investigator. 1 8
Section 245(b) defines the term "criminal
investigator" broadly as "any individual duly authorized by a
department, agency, or armed force of the United States to
conduct or engage in investigations for prosecutions for
violations of health care offenses."" 9 This new statute is much
broader than the existing statutes because it does not contain
the "by means of bribery" and "official proceedings"
120
limitations.
Penalties for these felony offenses include fines which vary
according to the damage to the particular federal program and a
maximum prison sentence of five to ten years.' 21 If the violation
results in serious bodily injury, the maximum sentence rises to
20 years, and if it results in death, the maximum sentence is life
122
imprisonment.
The new HIPAA misdemeanor is aimed primarily at
recipients of Medicare and Medicaid benefits. Section 217 of
HIPAA prohibits purposefully disposing of assets, including by
any transfer in trust, in order to qualify an individual for
Medicaid. 23 This provision has created some confusion amongst
estate planners who attempt to protect estate assets through
trusts at the end of life.12 In Montana, this has also been a
difficult hurdle for asset (land) rich but cash poor ranch families
when they are faced with a sick child or other catastrophic

117. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 244, 110
Stat. at 2017-18.
118. See id. § 245, 110 Stat. at 2018 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1518 (Supp II 1997)).
119. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 245(b), 110
Stat. at 2018.
120. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (1994) and 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (1994).
121. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 §§ 242(a)(2),
243(a)(2), 245(a), 110 Stat. at 2016-18.
122. See id.
123. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 217, 110
Stat. at 2008-09 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(6) (Supp. III 1997)).
124. Rovner, supra note 5, at 20.
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illness. 125
ii. Alterations in Existing Law
In addition to creating new laws, HIPAA also expands
existing health care law. Specifically, HIPAA expands the
definition of a kickback and materially alters the money
laundering, 126 asset forfeiture, 12 7 and injunctive relief
statutes,128 to cover "federal health care offenses." First, Section
241 of HIPAA redefined the term "federal health care offense"
broadly to include a criminal conspiracy to violate or a violation
of any new health care fraud statute 29 or any of the existing
applicable federal offenses if the violation involves a health care
program. 13 0 Next, Section 246 of HIPAA expanded the scope of
"specified unlawful activity" when including any act or activity
constituting an offense involving a federal health care offense as
a predicate act for a money laundering violation. 13 ' Then,
Section 249 amended the criminal forfeiture statute with a new
section containing mandatory forfeiture language, which states
that a court "shall order a person [convicted of a federal health
care offense] to forfeit property, real or personal, that constitutes
or is derived, directly or indirectly, from gross proceeds traceable
to the commission of the offense." 32
Lastly, Section 247
broadened the fraud injunction statute authorizing the
government to file a civil action to enjoin the commission or
imminent commission of a federal health care offense and to
freeze the assets of persons disposing of property obtained as a
125.
126.

Personal experience of the author in his cardiovascular surgical practice.
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 246, 110

Stat. at 2018.
127. See id. § 249, 110 Stat. at 2020.
128. See id. § 247, 110 Stat. at 2018 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (a)(1) (Supp. III
1997)).
129. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 241, 110
Stat. at 2016 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 24(a)(1) (Supp. III 1997)).
130. See id. § 241, 110 Stat. at 2016(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 24 (a)(2) (Supp III 1997))
to include false claims (18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994)); conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994)); theft
or embezzlement of employee benefit plans (18 U.S.C. § 664 (1994)); theft or bribery from
programs receiving federal funds (18 U.S.C. § 666 (1994)); false statements (18 U.S.C. §
1001 (1994)); false statements in ERISA documents (18 U.S.C. § 1027 (1994)); mail fraud
(18 U.S.C. § 1341(1994)); wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994)); and ERISA bribery (18
U.S.C. § 1954 (1994)).
131. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 246, 110
Stat. at 2018 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(7) (Supp. III 1997).
132. See id. § 249, 110 Stat. at 2020(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(6) (Supp. III
1997)) (emphasis added).
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result of a federal health care offense. 133
A subtle, but potentially one of the most profound, change
HIPAA made was to the anti-kickback statute.
The
anti-kickback statute prohibits knowingly and willfully
soliciting, receiving, offering, or paying any "remuneration" in
return for, or to induce, the furnishing or purchase of services or
goods under the Medicare or Medicaid programs. 134 There has
been a significant amount of controversy over whether waiving a
co-payment or deductible constituted remuneration to induce
patients to use a particular provider. Section 231 of HIPAA
clarifies this controversy by specifically stating that waving a copayment is a kickback unless it is done for a documented
financial need or failure to collect it after reasonable efforts. 135
Further, Section 204 extends it to all federal health care
programs except the Federal Employee Health Benefit
Program. 3 6 There has also been confusion about how to apply
the anti-kickback rules to managed care. As discussed supra,
Section 216 of HIPAA provides a safe harbor for remuneration
between individuals and managed care organizations as long as
137
the risk of non-payment is shared.
A common practice among physicians has been to routinely
waive deductibles and co-payments for patients with financial
hardship. However, co-payments and deductibles are considered
to be a part of the system of preventing overuse of Medicare and
133. See id. § 247, 110 Stat. at 2018(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (Supp. III 1997)).
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (Supp. III 1997)(emphasis added).
135. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 231(h), 110
Stat. at 2014 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6) (Supp. III 1997)).
136. See id. § 204, 110 Stat. at 2000 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320 a-7(b),(f)(Supp. III
1997)). This statute references 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(f) which defines Federal Health Plan
as "any plan or program that provides health benefits, whether directly, through
insurance, or otherwise, which is funded directly, in whole or in part, by the United
States Government (other than the health insurance program under chapter 89 or Title
5)." Here, the FEHBO is specifically excepted from coverage. The reason for this
exception is unclear. Professor Joan Krause at Loyola University has postulated the
following two possibilities: one is that the nature of the programs is different from
"federal health care programs" in general: it is merely an employee benefit plan, not a
publicly-supported health plan for a "vulnerable" population. Two, it's run through a
completely different part of the government than HHS (OMB), and is treated as more of
a pure government contracting program. Personal communication with Joan Krause,
Professor, Loyola University, in Chicago, 111. (Feb. 7, 2000).
137. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 216, 110
Stat. at 2007(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (Supp. III 1997)). Capitation is the
predominant example of this type of arrangement. A physician accepts a specific yearly
fee to care for a patient which is lowered to induce an increase in volume. As long as the
physician shares the risk of financial loss if the patient requires more care than the fee
pays for, this arrangement is defined as acceptable under HIPAA.
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Medicaid services by those very patients. Therefore, HIPAA
attempted to distinguish between permissible and impermissible
waivers of coinsurance and deductibles. 138
As defined by
HIPAA, remuneration now includes the routine waiver, or
partial waiver, of coinsurance and deductible amounts and the
transfer of items or services for free or for less than fair market
value. 3 9 However, HIPAA has added a safe harbor to allow a
certain amount of largess on the part of health care providers.
As long as the waiver is not offered as part of any advertisement
or solicitation, the provider does not routinely make such
waivers, the waiver was made after the provider determined in
good faith that the patient was in financial need or the provider
failed to collect the coinsurance or deductible after making
reasonable collection efforts, the waiver is considered
140
permissible.
C. Provisions to Increase Enforcement Resources
The underpinning of an effective statute is sufficient
resources to provide enforcement. Both branches of law
enforcement, investigation and prosecution, agree that thus far
the most important effect of HIPAA has been the infusion of
significant funds into enforcement. 14 1 As the amount of money
at risk for fraudulent conversion in health care has grown,
increasingly coordinated and sophisticated schemes have been
developed to divert those funds. Likewise, identification of
perpetrators requires increasing sophistication and expense. The
Medicare Integrity Program has also had a significant impact on
the early identification of fraudulent activity. 142 In the future,
three other provisions are likely to have significant effect on law
enforcement: 1) authorization of investigative subpoenas; 2) the
encouragement of qui tam actions; and 3) and the creation of
networking programs between private, state and federal fraud
control divisions.

138. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 231(h), 110
Stat. at 2014.
139. See id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6) (Supp. III 1997)).
140. See id.
141. Interview with Jimmy Weg, Director, and Shane Shaw, Lead Investigator,
Montana State Medicaid Fraud Investigation Unit, in Helena, Mont. (Apr. 6, 1999).
142. Interview with Joan Ashley, Director, Medicaid Surveillance Utilization
Review Service (SURS) in Helena, Mont. (Apr. 6, 1999).
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i. IncreasedFunding
Section 201(b) of HIPAA establishes the Health Care Fraud
and Abuse Control Account within the Federal Hospital
Insurance Trust Fund.143
A total of $661 million was
appropriated for HIPAA in 1997 increasing to $1.2 Billion by
2003.144 About two thirds of this money was directed to the
Medicare Integrity Program discussed below. 145
The
Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Justice
were authorized seventeen percent of this money to fund public
and private coordination of enforcement. 146 Seven percent of
this money was earmarked for the FBI to fund its involvement
in health care fraud and abuse enforcement 147 and ten percent of
these funds are reserved for the OIG in its anti-fraud activities
within Medicare and Medicaid. 148
In addition to these appropriated funds, all fines, penalties
and forfeitures collected as a result of criminal and civil health
fraud proceedings and recoveries involving health care items or
services made under the False Claims Act are deposited into the
Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account 149 and split
among the agencies that acted to recover the funds.
ii. Medicare Integrity Program
Section 202 of HIPAA authorizes the Medicare Integrity
Program. 150 This program authorizes HHS to contract with
private organizations to review and audit provider activities
within the Medicare program.' 5 '
HHS has used private
contractors to examine provider utilization activities, audit
Medicare cost reports, recover payments improperly made, and
143. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 201(b), 110
Stat. at 1992 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395i (Supp. III 1997)).
144. See id. § 201 (b)(3), 110 Stat. at 1994-96.
145. See id. § 201(b)(4), 110 Stat. at 1995-96.
146. See id § 201(b)(3), 110 Stat. at 1994-95; See also Colleen M. Faddick, Health
Care Fraud and Abuse: New Weapons, New Penalties, and New Fears for Providers
Created by the Health InsurancePortabilityand AccountabilityAct of 1996 ("HIPAA"), 6
ANN. HEALTH L. 77, 88 (1997).
147. See supra note 146.
148. See supra note 146.
149. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 201(b)(2)(c), 110 Stat. 1936, 1993-94.
150. See id. § 202(a), 110 Stat. at 1996 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(a) (Supp. III
1997).
151. See id. § 202(b), 110 Stat. at 1997 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(b) (Supp. III
1997).
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educate providers, beneficiaries and payers. 152 This has become
a very lucrative business.
Organizations eligible for such
contracts must have the demonstrated capability to conduct the
reviews and audits, and must comply with federal procurement
conflict of interest standards. 153 The organizations must also
agree to cooperate with OIG, the Department of Justice and
other government law enforcement agencies in the investigation
and deterrence of health care fraud and abuse.lm HHS can
establish additional qualifications as deemed appropriate but
155
must use competitive procedures to select new contractors.
iii. Investigative Subpoenas
Investigative subpoenas are authorized by Section 248 of
HIPAA.156
This tool has markedly simplified the task of
Medicare/Medicaid
fraud
investigators.
These
are
administrative subpoenas and do not require a grand jury for
issuance. The Department of Justice is authorized to issue
subpoenas in connection with examination into health fraud
crimes. 157 These subpoenas can require the production of records
158
and other documents and the testimony of their custodians.
Persons who comply with these subpoenas in good faith are
immune from federal and state civil liability. 159
Health
information about an individual brought to light by an
investigative subpoena may not be used or disclosed in any
proceeding, unless the proceeding arises out of and is directly
related to receipt of health care services, items, payments, a
fraudulent claim related to health of that individual, or the
government's receipt of court authorization upon a showing of
60
good cause.

152. Interview with Joan Ashley, Director, Medicaid Surveillance Utilization
Review Service (SURS), in Missoula, Mont. (Apr. 6, 1999).
153. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act § 202(c), 110 Stat. at
1997 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(c) (Supp III 1997)).
154. See id.
155. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 202(c)(4),
(d), 110 Stat. at 1997-98 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(c)(4)-(d) (Supp III 1997).
156. See id. § 248, 110 Stat. at 2018-20 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (Supp III 1997).
157. See id.
158. See id. § 248, 110 Stat. at 2018-20 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a) (Supp. III
1997)).
159. See id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3486(d) (Supp. III 1997)).
160. See id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3486(e) (Supp. III 1997)).
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iv. Qui Tam Actions
161 Qui
HIPAA does not specifically address qui tam actions.
tam in health care fraud is authorized by the 1986 amendments
to the False Claims Act. 162 HIPAA does however encourage
more individual participation in the enforcement of
Medicare/Medicaid fraud. Further, the increased penalties
HIPAA introduces makes qui tam actions potentially more
lucrative. These factors have combined to produce a dramatic
increase in health care qui tam cases. In fact, the predominant
target of qui tam actions recently shifted from defense
contractors to health care providers and the plaintiffs qui tam
63
bar is growing rapidly.

v. Coordinationof Private and Public Enforcement Activities
Section 201(a) of HIPAA directs the OIG and the
Department of Justice to implement programs that coordinate
federal, state, local and private activities to combat health care
fraud and abuse. 16 The programs are intended to facilitate
intergovernmental investigations, audits and inspections of
health care delivery and payments. 165 They are further designed
to coordinate and enforce criminal, civil and administrative
fraud and abuse controls. 166
The OIG has issued guidelines for coordinating public and
private health care fraud and abuse controls. 167 These guidelines
encourage private health plans and government enforcement
agencies to exchange data that may assist plans in effective
fraud and abuse controls and address quality of care
problems.'6 They also encourage the government and private
plans to exchange information about ongoing investigations and
161. See generally, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
162. See False Claims Amendment Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100
Stat. 3153. "The Committee's overall intent in amending the qui tam section of the False
Claims Act is to encourage more private enforcement suits." S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 23-24
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5288-89.
163. See Kaz Kikkawa, Medicare Fraud and Abuse and Qui Tam: The Dynamic Duo
or the Odd Couple, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 83, 93-95 (1998).
164. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 201(a), 110 Stat.
at 1992-93 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320 a-7(c) (Supp. II 1996 & Supp. III 1997)).
165. See id.

166.

See id.

167.
168.

See Rovner, supranote 5, at 21 n. 25.
See Rovner, supra note 5, at 21 n. 25.
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enforcement. Each government agency and each health plan
should designate "information coordinators" to facilitate these
information exchanges. The guidelines provide for confidential
treatment of patient information supplied to government
agencies by health plans and gives immunity to health plans for
providing information to OIG or the Department of Justice
169
unless they knowingly supply false information.
D. Provisions to Expand the Penaltiesfor Health CareFraud
A significant part of HIPAA follows the federal
government's "get tough" attitude toward health care fraud by
increasing penalties for conviction. Exclusion from Medicare
and Medicaid is the death knell for most health care
providers. 170
Mandatory exclusion can be likened to the
mandatory sentencing guidelines. Sections 211(a) and 211(b)
outline the mandatory program exclusions. 171 HHS must now
exclude from Medicare and Medicaid participation all persons
and organizations convicted of any felony federal health care
offense as well as for felony conviction relating to controlled
substances. 172 These bases for mandatory program exclusion are
added to those for criminal convictions related to the delivery of
health care items or services funded by Medicare or Medicaid,
and to criminal convictions for patient neglect or abuse. 173 The
174
minimum period of mandatory program exclusion is 5 years.
Exclusion for misdemeanor health care fraud convictions is
permissive. 75 The misdemeanor federal crime, newly created by
HIPAA, gives federal prosecutors a bargaining chip in plea
arrangements. If charges can be reduced to a misdemeanor with
restitution, a fraudfeasor may be induced to testify against a
more culpable co-defendant in exchange for a sentencing
169. See Rovner, supra note 5, at 21 n. 25.
170. See Siddiqi v. United States, 98 F.3d 1427 (2d Cir. 1996). In this case, an
oncologist's conviction for Medicare fraud over a $640.88 billing dispute was overturned.
Yet, the fallout of the case resulted in him losing a $825,000/year practice and the
interest on $150,000 for a five year period. Additionally, he was reduced to working for
$85,000 per year at a Veterans Hospital.
171. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, § 211, 110 Stat. 1936, 2003-04 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(Supp II 1996 &
Supp. III 1997)).
172. See id. §§ 211(a)(1) and (b)(1), 110 Stat. at 2003-04 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7 (Supp II 1996 & Supp. III 1997)).
173. See id.
174. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (Supp. II 1996 & Supp. III 1997).
175. See id § 1320a-7(b) (Supp. II 1996 & Supp. III 1997).
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recommendation that does not include Medicaid/Medicare
exclusion. The maximum period of permissive exclusion is three
years. 176

Sections 213 and 214 of HIPAA increase the liability of
177
owners and managers of sanctioned health care organizations.
Individuals who own or control sanctioned organizations and
who know or should know of the sanctionable offenses are
subject to permissive program exclusion. 178 A sanctioned
organization is one that is convicted of any felony or
misdemeanor federal health care offense. 179
Officers and
managers of sanctioned organizations are subject to permissive
program exclusion, regardless of their degree of actual
180
knowledge.
HIPAA creates specific penalties to deal with Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMO) which try to make a profit
by restricting services provided to patients or excluding eligible
patients in Section 215.181 A HMO that fails to comply with its
Medicare contracts is subject to fines ranging from $10,000 per
week until the compliance deficiency is corrected, to $25,000 per
deficiency that adversely affects its beneficiaries. 8 2 If the
deficiency involves improper beneficiary exclusion or expulsion,
the fines increase to $100,000 per determination and $15,000 for
each individual improperly denied enrollment. 8 3
Lastly, in Sections 231 and 232, HIPAA increases monetary
penalties for civil fraud and abuse from $2,000 to $10,000 per
count and from double to treble the amount of improper or
excess reimbursement claimed.'84 The imposition of civil
monetary penalties is extended to include not just Medicare and
Medicaid but every federal health plan, except the Federal
176. See id. § 1320a-7(c) (Supp. II 1996 & Supp. III 1997).
177. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, §§ 213, 214, 110 Stat. 1936, 2005 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1320 a-7(b) (Supp. II
1996)); 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b)(Supp. II 1996)).
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(15)(A)(i) (Supp. III 1997).
179. See id. § 1320a-7(b)(15)(B) (Supp. III 1997).
180. See id. § 213, 110 Stat. at 2005 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(15)(A)(ii)
(Supp. III 1997)).
181. See id. § 215, 110 Stat. at 2005 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1395mm (1994 & Supp. II
1996 & Supp. III 1997).
182. See id. § 215, 110 Stat. at 2005-07 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1395 mm(i)(6)(c)
(Supp. III 1997)).
183. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (1994).
184. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, §§ 231, 232, 110 Stat. 1936, 2012-15 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (Supp. II
1996 & Supp III 1997).
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Employee Health Benefit Program. 185 Individuals who have
been excluded from program participation, but remain owners,
officers or managers of a participating organization and know or
should know of sanctionable conduct by that organization, may
be personally liable for civil monetary penalties. 186 The level of
culpability for imposition of civil monetary penalties requires
only that the sanctionable conduct be undertaken knowingly and
187
clearly states that no specific intent to defraud is required.
E. Other Important Provisions
In addition to the provisions listed supra, HIPAA authorizes
two miscellaneous provisions that may have a significant impact
on health care fraud: incentives for efficiency suggestions and
bounties for whistleblowers.
In the first provision, HIPAA
actively solicits efficiency suggestions in Section 203(c).1 8 These
suggestions are submitted directly to HHS and may trigger a
financial award to individuals whose suggestions HHS adopts.189
The second important provision is the "whistleblower"
provision in Section 203(b) of HIPAA. 190 HHS is authorized to
pay awards to individuals who report Medicare fraud and
abuse. 191 Reports that result in collection of at least one
hundred dollars may, at the discretion of the Secretary of HHS,
be rewarded with a portion of the amount collected. 192 In
implementing this program, HHS is directed to adopt
procedures that will minimize any reports of frivolous or
irrelevant information. 193
The whistleblower provision has
already had a significant effect on the way investigations are

185. See id.; See also supra note 136.
186. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 §§ 231, 232,
110 Stat. at 2012-15 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (Supp. II & Supp III 1997)).
187. See id.
188. See id. § 203(c), 110 Stat. at 1999 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-5 (Supp. III
1997)).
189. See id. § 203, 110 Stat. at 1998-99 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-5 (Supp. III
1997)).
190. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 203(b), 110
Stat. at 1999 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-5 (Supp. III 1997)).
191. See id. § 203, 110 Stat. at 1998-99 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1395b-5 (Supp. III
1997)).
192. See id. § 203(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 1999 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1395b-5 (Supp. III
1997)).
193. See id § 203(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 1999 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1395b-5 (Supp. III
1997).
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initiated and conducted. 194
V. How HIPAA IS CURRENTLY AFFECTING MONTANA
The effects of HIPAA on the State of Montana can be
summed up in a single word: money. To date, no health care
fraud case has been specifically charged using the HIPAA
statutes. The primary effect of HIPAA has been to infuse
financial support into the Medicare/Medicaid fraud investigation
and prosecution systems and to encourage cooperation between
the federal and state governments in addressing the fraud
epidemic. The following four sections report the field research
the author completed in researching this paper.
A. InitialReporting of Medicaid Fraudin Montana
The author interviewed Joan Ashley, director of the
Medicaid Surveillance Utilization Review Service (SURS) in
Montana. 195 This administrative division of Health and Human
Services is required by Medicaid and funded seventy-five
percent by the federal government and twenty-five percent by
the state. Its mission is to monitor health care expenditures,
seek out overpayments and identify potential fraudulent billing.
SURS obtains its information from three sources: 1)
statistical analysis of claims; 2) direct queries of Medicaid
recipients; and 3) whistleblowers. The statistical analysis is
accomplished by an Atlanta based company, Consultech. This
company has a contract with the federal government to process
Medicaid data in search of fraud. All Medicaid claims are
submitted to Consultech which employs sophisticated computer
modeling to identify billing patterns which are aberrant based
on parameters set in consultation the federal Medicaid office
and with SURS in Montana. 196 Direct queries are accomplished

194.

See, e.g., David R. Olmos, Health Care's New Breed of Whistle-Blower, L.A.

TIMES, Feb. 17, 1998, at Al. (Dr. Jim Montagano, a surgeon, initiated a false claims

lawsuit where the federal government recovered a 12.6 million dollar settlement and
paid Mangano and his lawyer a 2.3 million dollar share).
195. Interview with Joan Ashley, Director, Medicaid Surveillance Utilization
Review Service (SURS), in Helena, Mont. (Apr. 6, 1999).

The information discussed

infra in Part V. A. regarding the initial reporting of Medicaid fraud in Montana was
gained from this interview.
196. This type of modeling is called exception based identification. It uses
parameters such as number of services per unit population, numbers of recipients per
provider, number of visits per recipient, etc., and compares these to national standards
and local usage patterns. If an exception is identified, SURS then investigates further.
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by EOMB forms. 197 The Montana SURS sends out three
hundred EOMB forms per month to Medicaid recipients asking
for verification of services performed. Lastly, SURS maintains a
telephone "hotline" for whistleblowers. Informants using this
line have included patients, physicians and office personnel.
Once SURS identifies an aberrant pattern of billing, it
requests documentation 198 of the services billed from the
provider. If the provider can supply adequate documentation,
no further action is taken except to warn the provider its
practices may not comport with national standards and ask that
provider to review its practices. If the provider cannot supply
documentation, SURS exercises considerable discretion in
deciding whether there is potential fraud or simple mistake. If
the SURS caseworker feels there is a mistake, she will ask the
provider to repay the "overpayment" and change its billing
practice. The case worker has the discretion to allow up to
ninety days to repay without interest and a year to repay with
interest accruing only after ninety days.
SURS also has
administrative authority to impose sanctions' 99 such as
restricting providers to pre-approval or removing them
altogether from the approved Medicaid provider list. Any
sanctions imposed by Medicaid are reported to Medicare. If the
provider disputes the caseworker's interpretation of a regulation
or imposition of a sanction, it is entitled to administrative due
process. 20 0 If the caseworker suspects fraudulent intent, she
refers the case to the fraud investigation unit. The statute of
limitations is eight years but SURS rarely looks back farther
than 3 years at a billing pattern.
The SURS communicates frequently with the fraud unit and
meets formally once a month to discuss open cases in both
agencies. Currently SURS has approximately 270 open cases.
The majority of these cases involve suppliers of durable medical

197. See supranotes 97-98 and accompanying text.
198. The documentation depends on the service provided. In direct patient care
from physicians, it consists of office notes, in durable medical equipment it consists of a
'certificate of medical need" signed by a physician, from pharmacists, it is a copy of the
prescription, etc.
199. See MONT. ADMIN R. 46-12-401 (1989).
200. The first step is a telephone hearing with the caseworker, the director of
SURS, and anyone else the provider wishes. Next, there is a hearing before an
administrative law judge where experts may testify. Finally, there may be an appeal to
district court and ultimately to the Montana Supreme Court. There have been several
appeals to district court but none to the Montana Supreme Court.
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equipment, medical supply retailers and home health care
agencies. SURS has excluded only nine physicians in the last
three years. Physicians and other direct health care providers
tend to comply quickly because a significant amount of their
practices depend on Medicare and Medicaid. Also, physician
transgressions are more difficult to detect and prosecute due to
the intimacy of the physician-patient relationship and
subjectivity of medical decision making. As a result, SURS
concentrates its efforts with physicians on assisting with
compliance rather than punishment.
Last year SURS saved Montana Medicaid $450,000 by
requiring prior authorization and recovered another $300,000 in
improperly documented claims. SURS refers twenty to thirty
cases per year to the fraud unit for investigation, and in the
three years of cooperation between these two agencies, only two
referred claims have not resulted in a conviction.
B. Initial Investigationof Medicaid Fraud in Montana
The author interviewed Jimmy Weg, director, and Shane
Shaw, lead investigator, of the Montana Medicaid Fraud Control
Unit (Unit).201 Medicaid fraud units were mandated by the
Medicaid Reform Act of 1978, but Montana's Unit was not
established until April, 1996.
If the Unit had not been
established in 1996, Montana would have lost the federal
portion of its Medicaid funding. The Unit is comprised of a
director, four agents and two support staff. Mr. Weg came to
health care fraud investigation from an eighteen year career
investigating securities fraud in New York. Mr. Shaw has
fourteen years experience as a detective investigating primarily
white collar crimes.
In order for the Montana Unit to investigate cases of fraud,
it must have the potential for criminal prosecution.
The
Attorney General made this policy decision in order to reserve
Montana's limited resources for criminal cases only. If an
investigation is completed and there is insufficient evidence to
warrant a criminal charge, but there exists sufficient evidence
for a civil case, Mr. Weg refers the case to the U.S. Attorney for
prosecution under their concurrent jurisdiction.
201. Interview with Jimmy Weg, Director, and Shane Shaw, Lead Investigator,
Montana State Medicaid Fraud Investigation Unit, in Helena, Mont. (Apr. 6, 1999). The
information discussed infra in Part V. B. regarding the initial investigation of Medicaid
fraud in Montana was gained from this interview.
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Mr. Weg opined that health care fraud investigation is more
difficult than the investigation of securities fraud. One reason
for the difficulty includes the newer, less well established, and
constantly changing health care regulations. Additionally, there
are more health care crimes than securities crimes, and these
health care crimes contain many elements. Finally, the rules for
Medicaid reimbursement differ for every type of provider,
making the Unit more dependent upon other agencies and
experts.
Medicaid participation gives the Unit the right to
reasonably inspect any Medicaid providers records. This means
they can go into the office during working hours and ask to see
specific records. A warrant is required to seize those records. If
records are seized, the fraud unit must make copies available as
needed for the health care provider to deliver care.
The actual investigation of a case involves a large amount of
paperwork. The investigators first review all the claims data
and billing practices.
This may involve several thousand
individual documents. Then they proceed into the field and
interview the provider, billing clerks, suppliers and patients. It
takes about a year to fully investigate a complex claim but some
investigations can be concluded in a few months.
The Unit averages 30-45 new cases per year and has 20-25
cases open at any given time. Most of the cases they have
referred for prosecution have been successful and involve
durable medical equipment companies. However, their work
has resulted in the successful prosecution of three physicians
with two convictions and one deferred prosecution and
restitution agreement. The unit has successfully recovered
about four million dollars in the three years of its existence. The
recoveries have ranged from twenty-five thousand to seven
hundred fifty thousand dollars.
A last interesting point that was made both by Mr. Weg and
Ms. Ashley 20 2 is the ease with which Medicaid fraud is
perpetrated. Ms. Ashley stated that any "clean"203 request for
reimbursement will be paid. She further stated that since the
review is retrospective, it takes from thirty to ninety days for a
claim to surface as improper. Mr. Weg points out that this delay
has been referred to as a "license to steal"20 4 and resulted in the
202. See supra note 195.
203. A clean claim is a claim with all the blanks properly filled out which has a
valid Medicaid provider number and a valid Medicaid participant number.
204. "Cheating Medicare is as easy as filling out a four page form that asks only for
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penetration of organized crime into the health care field. 20 5
C. State Prosecutionof MedicaidFraudin Montana
The author interviewed Barbara Harris, the assistant state
prosecuting attorney who handles all the Medicaid fraud cases
along with her job sharing partner Kathy Seeley. 206 On a state
level, Ms. Harris stated HIPAA has had very little influence yet.
The state has prosecuted only ten fraud cases and three have
been against physicians. Ms. Harris says her office is aware of
the statute mainly because of the mandatory and permissive
exclusions that are specified by federal program administrators
after a state conviction.
D. FederalProsecutionof Medicare and Medicaid Fraudin
Montana
The author interviewed Leif Johnson, Assistant United
States Attorney in charge of Health care Fraud Prosecution in
Montana. 2 7 Interestingly, Mr. Johnson has not yet used HIPAA
in the prosecution of health care fraud. The statutes he most
commonly uses include mail fraud, wire fraud, false statements,
false claims and conspiracy. Mr. Johnson felt that HIPAA has
had minimal effect on his day to day work of prosecuting health
care fraud, although he opined that it has had a profound effect
on the administration of health care, particularly in the area of

basic information: name, address phone number and a statement saying the operators
have not been in trouble with Medicare before. Most of the time that information is not
even verified, allowing anyone with a $15 per month mail box and a beeper to go into the
Medicare supply business. What we have seen is a series of health care providers come
into existence solely on paper. This allowed two Russian 6migrds to open a fictitious
company in Southern California, bill Medicaid for a billion dollars, collect fifty million
dollars and disappear." Sparrow, supranote 4, 8-9.
205. The FBI has intelligence showing cocaine traffickers in Florida and California
are switching from drug dealing to healthcare fraud because healthcare fraud is safer,
more lucrative, the risk of being caught is smaller and the sentences are much less
severe. Gaming the Health Care System: Trends in Health Care Fraud:HearingBefore
the Special Committee on Aging, 104th Cong. 12 (1995)(statement of F.B.I. Director Louis
J. Freeh).
206. Interview with Barbara Harris, Assistant United States Attorney, United
States Attorney's Office, in Helena, Mont. (April 9, 1999). The information discussed
infra in Part V.C. regarding the state prosecution of Medicaid fraud in Montana was
gained from this interview.
207. Interview with Leif Johnson, Assistant United States Attorney, United States
Attorney's Office, in Billings, Mont. (Apr. 2, 1999). The information discussed infra in
Part V.D. regarding the federal prosecution of Medicare and Medicaid fraud in Montana
was gained from this interview.
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administrations adopting corporate compliance programs.
Mr. Johnson praised HIPAA for the increase in funding
provided to law enforcement. He stated that before HIPAA, the
sparsely populated western states of Wyoming and Montana
were not priorities of the FBI or Office of the Inspector General
because there was simply not enough money at issue to make
prosecution cost effective. However, in Montana alone, the
enactment of HIPAA has resulted in the addition of an FBI
agent specifically funded by HIPAA, a health care fraud
investigator hired by the Office of the Inspector General, a
health care fraud investigator hired by the Department of
Justice, and Mr. Johnson's position. Additionally, Sherry Scheel
Matteucci, the United States Attorney for Montana, stated that
funding for a second health care prosecutor was recently
approved. 208
These changes resulted in the United States
recovering in excess of 1.1 million dollars in 1998 from health
care fraud perpetrated in the State of Montana.
Another provision of HIPAA that Mr. Johnson felt has
impacted health care fraud is the delegation of subpoena power
to the Office of the Inspector General. This broad subpoena
power produces evidence that can be used in a civil proceeding
in opposition to the criminal grand jury subpoenas which cannot
be used civilly due to secrecy provisions surrounding the grand
jury proceedings. Mr. Johnson also praised the misdemeanor
health care fraud provision of HIPAA.
Mr. Johnson was critical of the mandatory sentencing
provisions of HIPAA because they make his job more difficult.
As discussed above, HIPAA made Medicare and Medicaid
209
exclusion mandatory after conviction of health care fraud.
Mr. Johnson said this has made it virtually impossible for him
to plead out minor offenders to any health care fraud claim
because the financial impact of Medicare/Medicaid exclusion
overshadows the financial penalties of the statute. Health care
providers would rather take a chance in court with higher
penalties than lose their Medicare/Medicaid base.
This
provision has increased the costs of investigation and
prosecution and decreased the flexibility of prosecutorial
discretion. Although Mr. Johnson did not state this, it also
seems as if it would make many conspiracies that would be
208.
Attorney
Program
209.

United States Attorney Sherry Scheel Matteucci, Remarks at the Government
Panel sponsored by the University of Montana School of Law's Clinical
(March 24, 1999).
See discussion supra Part IV.D.
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relatively easy to prove with a co-conspirator witness very
difficult to prove because all witnesses are also parties to the
fraud in some way and all stand to lose their livelihood if they
admit guilt.
Mr. Johnson stated the Qui Tam actions 210 have been on a
steep increase in response to the whistleblower provisions of
HIPAA. He commented that this is very easy work for the
plaintiffs bar which has only to bring the case to the
government. The government does all the investigative work
and the plaintiff whistleblower and her attorney recoup up to
thirty percent of the settlement.
The federal prosecutor's office also works closely with the
state Medicaid Fraud Unit. In Montana, prosecutorial and
judicial resources are limited to prosecuting only criminal
Medicaid matters. Accordingly, the Unit has many civil cases
without the resources to prosecute them. The United States
Attorney's office takes cases where there is the possibility of
recovering significant resources, and, after prosecution, splits
the recovery with seventy-five percent to the federal government
and twenty-five percent to the state.
Criminal health care fraud cases are much more difficult to
prosecute than civil cases because of the increased burden of
proving all elements beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore unless
the conduct was particularly egregious, the program severely
damaged, or a patient was injured, prosecutions are usually
civil, especially in smaller cases. A small case is considered a
case involving five to twenty-five thousand dollars. A large case
that clearly meets the standard of severely damaging the
program is one hundred thousand dollars or more. Between
twenty-five and one hundred thousand dollars is a middle
ground where the direction of the case is subject to prosecutorial
discretion.
VI. REPORTED CASES CITING HIPAA
As of 1997, only two cases had been reported which cited the
HIPAA statute. 211 Both these early cases dealt with the
question of whether HIPAA was intended to completely preempt
210. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
211. Westlaw search in state and federal case databases using the terms HIPAA or
HIPAA (a common typo) or "104-191." More recently, another case dealt with the HIPAA
statute. A Wisconsin federal district court concluded that HIPAA non-discrimination
provision did not apply in the year that the Act was passed. See Stang v. Clifton
Gunderson Health Care Plan, 71 F. Supp. 2d 926, 932-33 (1999).
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state law.
In Means v. Independent Life and Accident
2
12
Company, the insureds paid premiums for a hospitalization
policy for more than forty years. 213 When they tried to use their
policy, they were told it had been terminated at age seventy
despite the fact the company continued to accept premiums and
never notified the plaintiff of termination. 214 The plaintiff sued
for fraud and bad faith in state court, but the insurance
company moved to remove the case to federal court based on
preemption by HIPAA. 215 The defendant claimed that the
plaintiff referenced HIPAA and in order to adjudicate their
claim a court would have to interpret HIPAA, making the case a
matter of federal law. 2 16 The court examined the matter and
concluded that the state claims did not require resolution of a
substantial question of federal law and thus remanded the case
217
to state court.
218
In Wright v. Combined Insurance Company of America,
the plaintiff filed suit in state court and the insurance company
moved to remove to federal court on the basis of diversity and
federal question preemption. 21 9 The court stated removal due to
preemption can only occur if the state claim is completely
preempted by federal law. 220 The court then examined HIPAA
and found no evidence of "manifest congressional intent" to
221
create a new cause of action removable to federal court.
Rather, the court found the defendant failed to demonstrate that
the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction and remanded
222
the action to state court.
Thus it seems clear both from the purpose of the statute and
from these two early cases that courts are likely to hold that
health care fraud continues to be a matter for both state and
federal court.223 If a claim is brought under HIPAA, it will need

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

963 F. Supp. 1131 (M.D. Ala. 1997)
See id. at 1132.
See id.
See id. at 1132-1133.
See id. at 1135-1136.
See Means v. Independent Life and Accident Co., 963 F. Supp. 1131, 1135-36

(M.D. Ala. 1997).
218. 959 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Miss. 1997).
219.

See id. at 358-59.

220.
221.

See id. at 362.
See id. at 363.

222. See id. at 364.
223. In July, 1999, an Alabama federal district court, relying on Means and Wright,
concluded that HIPAA's first and second provisions did not mandate the application of
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to be adjudicated in federal court. However, if a claim is
brought under state Medicaid fraud law, it cannot be removed to
federal court merely for referencing HIPAA.
VII. POSSIBLE FUTURE IMPACTS OF HIPAA IN MONTANA AND
THE UNITED STATES

HIPAA is a new statute and although there has been a lot of
press about its sweeping changes, it's effects are only now
becoming manifest. At this point it is premature to predict the
magnitude and direction of those changes with absolute
certainty. This section addresses the two areas where HIPAA is
currently having the most impact.
A. CorporateCompliance Programs
HIPAA has had and will likely continue to have a major
influence on the way health care entities transact business. The
increased penalties and the "should have known" standard for
owners and managers have created an atmosphere where
proactivity is an absolute necessity. Philip H. Hilder says in his
article on corporate compliance programs for HIPAA:
The health care system is being watched under a scanning bright
light, and should that light fall upon the unwary, the
consequences could be crippling or even fatal to an
enterprise .... The time has passed, if indeed it ever existed when
the response to the detection of an aggressive billing technique
was at most a disallowance or adjustment. Attorneys must now
advise their clients about the parameters of the law before
contracts are entered into or billing begins .... The emphasis must
be on prevention because the mere allegation and/or investigation,
even without
filed charges, can ruin a health care provider or
supplier. 224
Since the question of health care fraud often turns on the
issue of intent, corporations can help themselves by establishing
a clear record of intent. Corporate compliance programs (CCP)
are one of the best ways to accomplish this. An optimal CCP
must document that a company maintains written standards of
conduct for employees, institutes written policies that promote
the complete preemption doctrine. See Cowan v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 67 F.
Supp. 2d 1312, 1320 (1999).
224. Philip H. Hilder & Lon Mullen, HIPAA Time for a Health Care Corporate
Compliance Program,FED. LAW., MarJApr. 1998, at 34, 34-35.
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compliance and eliminate incentives for non-compliance,
educates and trains employees, disciplines non-compliant
employees and performs regular internal self audits. 225 Further,
the federal sentencing guidelines specifically outline that
"[clulpability generally will be determined by the steps taken by
the organization prior to the offense to prevent and detect
criminal conduct . . and the organizations actions after an
offense has been committed"and specifically permit a downward
departure in fines and other sanctions imposed if the
organization is found to have an active CCP which addresses
226
these areas.
The HHS OIG has viewed CCPs favorably and has designed
its own model plan "to help hospitals become good corporate
citizens and better abide by the rules and regulations of doing
business with the government."227 Janet Reno supported this
model and said, "[to medical laboratories who ignore this
advice, our warning is clear: we will bring the full weight of the
federal government's powers to bear to enforce the law and

protect the American people from being ripped

off."2 2 8

Thus,

CCPs have become a necessity under HIPAA because they
significantly improve a business entity's negotiating position
with federal authorities, and, even if an entity is convicted, the
presence of a CCP provides relief under the sentencing
229
guidelines.
B. Application of the Cheek - RatzlafDoctrine
As discussed, 230 it is a long established principal of
American criminal jurisprudence that ignorance of the law is no
excuse for violating it. In Cheek and Ratzlaf, the United States
Supreme Court carved out an exception to this maxim for
statutes in which Congress includes the term "willfulness." The
Ninth Circuit applied Cheek and Ratzlaf to health care fraud in
Hanlester.23 ' The Hanlester decision generated a significant
controversy both between the various circuits as mentioned
225. See id. at 37.
226. See Thomas E. Bartrum & L. Edward Bryant, Jr., The Brave New World of
Health Care Compliance Programs, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 51, 57-61 (1997); See also
UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8Al. 1 cmt. n. 1 (1999).

227.

Hilder & Mullen, supra note 224, at 35.

228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 37.
See id. at 38.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390 (9 th Cir. 1995).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol61/iss1/7

42

2000

ACT OF 1996 (HIPAA)

217

Eddy: The Effect of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996

supra 232 and in the academic community. 233 Recently, in a
firearms case entitled United States v. Bryan,234 the United
States Supreme Court clarified its exceptions in Cheek and
Ratzlaf in a six to three decision holding that those decisions
were limited to "highly technical statutes that presented a
danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent
conduct." 23 5 The language in Bryan strongly favors defendants
in the interpretation of health care fraud statutes because
health care fraud statutes are generally acknowledged as
236
comparable in technicality to banking regulation statutes.
Thus, based on their obligation to protect individuals from
substantial punishment for inadvertent crimes, 237 more circuits
will likely join the Ninth Circuit in applying specific intent to
health care fraud. If the United States Supreme Court is forced
to resolve a split in the circuits over this issue, its jurisprudence
in Cheek, Ratzlaf, and Bryan practically mandates that criminal
conviction for health care fraud requires specific intent.

VIII. A FINAL CRITIQUE OF HIPAA' S INADEQUACIES
HIPAA will inevitably have a profound effect on health care
financing and delivery in Montana. Already local insurance
companies are anticipating the need to insure against the risk of
inadvertent health care fraud, 238 physicians are seeking out
239
experts to conduct seminars in how to avoid billing mistakes,
and health care entities are rushing to adopt corporate
232. See discussion supra Part II C and notes 30-37.
233. See, e.g., Sharon L. Davies, Guidance on the Meaning of "Willfulness Looming?
How Bryan Might Affect the Hanlester Debate, HEALTH LAW, Mar. 1998, at 14. See also
James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care
Marketplace:Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J. LAW & MED. 205 (1996); Brian
J. Hennigan & Arif Alikhan, Willfulness and Specific Intent Under the Medicare AntiKickback Statutes: The Continuing Debate Over Whether Ignorance of the Law is a
Defense in Medicare Prosecutions,A.B.A. CENTER FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. NAT'L
INST. CRIM. JUST. SEC. wHITE COLLAR CRIME (March 6-7, 1997).
234. 524 U.S. 184(1998).
235. Id. at 194.
236. See generally Bucy, supra note 22, at 870-882.
237. See Andrea Tuwiner Vavonese, Comment, The Medicare Anti-Kickback
Provision of the Social Security Act-Is Ignorance of the Law an Excuse for Fraudulent
and Abusive Use of the System?, 45 Cath. U. L. Rev 943, 976 (1996).
238. Toole and Easter, The Doctor's Company, Utah Medical and Physicians
Insurance all are considering offering Inadvertent Healthcare Fraud Insurance to
physicians. Interviews with claims representatives of various insurance companies,
Missoula, Mont. (Apr. 9-18, 1999).
239. Interview with Mike Swietzer, President, Montana Medical Association, in
Billings, Mont. (Apr. 28, 1999).
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compliance plans. 240 However, the question of whether HIPAA
will actually prevent health care fraud remains unanswered.
HIPAA is a far reaching, recently established statute
impacting multiple areas of health care in a somewhat
disjointed fashion. 24 1 This is because HIPAA is, in reality, the
resurrected remains of the comprehensive Clinton health plan of
1994 and thus a political creature full of significant
compromises. 242 Despite HIPAA's somewhat "schizophrenic"
nature, 24 Title II is a well conceived and executed attack
against health care fraud in the existing health care system.
Unfortunately, HIPAA merely addresses the existing health care
system and does not mandate the changes necessary to
eliminate fraud.
In medical terms, HIPAA attacks the
244
symptoms of health care fraud instead of the disease itself.
Clearly, HIPAA has increased enforcement of the health
care anti-fraud laws by increasing penalties and infusing more
money into enforcement activity, but it fails to require Medicare
and Medicaid to promulgate sufficiently specific guidelines to
providers. 245 Existing Medicare and Medicaid guidelines are a
complex minefield of provisions 246 now wrapped by HIPAA in
more stringent penalties for non-compliance. 247 The increased
governmental scrutiny of providers coupled with failure to
provide clear guidelines engenders an atmosphere of distrust
between legitimate health care providers and the federal
government. Further, the severity of the penalties promotes
this adversarial relationship, thwarting cooperation between
honest providers and Medicare/Medicaid administrators. This
hostile environment is exemplified in the reticence of providers
to consult the OIG seeking advisory opinions. 24
Until there is a significant policy change in the way health
care is delivered, fraud by dishonest providers is likely to

240. Interview with Jack Burke, Vice President, St. Patrick Hospital, in Missoula,
Mont. (Apr. 28, 1999).

241.
242.

See discussion supra Part III and notes 59-61.
See supra note 61.

243.
244.
245.

See supra note 61.
See discussion supra Part II.A and notes 15-20.
See generally Title II of The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability

Act of 1996, Pub, L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
246. Medicare and Medicaid guidelines vary for each different category of provider
and recipient and fill hundreds of volumes and thousands of pages. Terminology is
complex and precise meaning of terms often varies within differing healthcare fields.
247. See discussion supra Part IV.

248.

See supra notes 66-67.
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continue at a high level. 249 Willie Sutton robbed banks because
that was where the money was, but he never stopped because
Wells Fargo offered a generous reward for his capture and the
federal government threatened to hang him.
Similarly,
dishonest health care providers are unlikely to alter fraudulent
behavior when the remuneration is so great that cocaine dealers
are changing professions. 250
Moreover, honest health care
providers now are at risk for prosecution for inadvertent errors
and discrepancies of rule interpretation made in the complex
morass of health care regulation. 251 These honest providers will
simply insure against the risk, further increasing the cost of
health care, although HIPAA will have successfully shifted this
cost from the government to the private provider. The solution
to the health care fraud problem is not to increase scrutiny,
paperwork and punishment in a defective system. Only if
Congress changes the health care delivery system to reduce the
opportunity for and remuneration of fraud will hardened
criminals forego transition from traditional illegal activities into
health care252 and intelligent,
informed
professionals
comprehend and comply with the essential regulations
253
governing their profession.
The problem of health care fraud in the current system is
not likely to decrease in the predictable future. Baby boomers
will reach retirement age in the year 2010 and the retirement
wave will not stop for twenty years. 254 Accompanying this trend
249. See Bucy, supra note 22, at 931-32. See also Bucy, supra note 8, § 1.0112], at
1-5 & 1-6.
250. See supra note 205.
251. See Siddiqi v. United States, 98 F.3d 1427 (2d Cir. 1996)(where an oncologist
whose conviction for Medicare fraud over a $640.88 billing dispute was overturned, but
only after he lost an $825,000/year practice, the interest on $150,000 for a five year
period and was reduced to working for $85,000 per year at a Veterans Hospital). See also
United States v. Migliaccio, 34 F.3d 1517 (10th Cir. 1994)(where the 10 th Circuit

overturned the district court conviction of two gynecologists who billed CHAMPUS for a
"fallopian tube repair" (a reimbursable procedure) after they performed "reversal of a
tubal ligation" (a non-reimbursable procedure) because the surgeons did not know that
CHAMPUS did not permit tubal ligation reversal for infertility and in medical
terminology the reversal of a tubal ligation may be properly described as a fallopian tube
repair).
252. See supra note 205.
253. See Bucy, supra note 8, § 1.04 [21, at 1-46 (stating that the existing rules in
health care are so complex that intelligent professionals can neither comprehend them
nor figure out how to comply with them).
254. See WILLIAM STERLING AND STEPHEN WAITE, BOOMERNOMICS: THE FuTuRE OF
YOUR MONEY IN THE UPCOMING GENERATIONAL WARFARE, x -xi and 2 and 3 (1998) (the

seventy-six million Americans born between 1945 and 1965 will begin to turn 65 in
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will be a marked increase in utilization of health services by the
aging population. Just as Post-War children reaching school age
swamped public schools in the 1950s, baby boomer hormonal
surges ignited a sexual revolution in the 1960s, and boomers
housing their families inflated the real estate market in the
1970s and 1980s, the public health care system will likely be
overwhelmed by graying boomers in the early 2000s. 255 Because

older people tend to be more conservative and more
conscientious about voting, the aging baby boomers will exercise
considerable political clout. It is likely they will wield that clout
to protect their health and futures, infusing increasing financial
resources into the health care system. 256 As more money enters
the system, more fraudfeasors will be attracted to the growing
pot of government gold.
This author concludes that HIPAA is unlikely to
significantly remedy the health care fraud problem. HIPAA is
at once too narrow and too broad to efficiently accomplish its
stated purposes. It is too narrow because it acts primarily
retrospectively, applying penalties after the fraudulent actions.
It fails to alter the fee for service structure of Medicare and
Medicaid which provides fertile soil for fraud to flourish.
Further, the current surveillance system is slow and ponderous
and totally inadequate to monitor sophisticated schemes to
defraud patients, private insurers and the government. 257
HIPAA is at the same time too broad. Its provisions may
ensnare honest health care providers who misinterpret complex
rules as well as fraudfeasors. Further, actions of an individual
can be imputed to an entity and actions of an entity can be
imputed to an individual. 258 An individual joining an entity at
management level may be subject to permissive sanctions
despite having had no relationship with the entity when
activities prompting the sanction occurred. 25 9
Similarly,
inadvertently hiring a sanctioned individual may expose the
entity to exclusion. 260 Thus the newly created fraud fighting

2010).
255. See id. at 3.
256. See id. at 17.
257. See discussion supra Part V.A-B and note 177.
258. See Colleen M. Faddick, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: New Weapons, New
Penalties,and New FearsForProviders Createdby the Health InsurancePortabilityand
Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 77, 88-89 (1997).
259. See id. at 89.
260. See id.
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mechanisms can trigger a domino like effect where the
purposeful or inadvertent actions of an individual could topple
an entire entity and bring the effects of exclusion, monetary
penalty and criminal prosecution down upon affiliated entities
26 1
which have minimal culpability.
What effect will HIPAA ultimately have in Montana? This
author does not have a crystal ball and only time will reveal how
many fraudulent acts will actually be punished, how many
fraudfeasors will escape punishment and how many unwitting
health care providers will be caught in HIPAA's widely cast net.

261.

See generally id. at 86-96.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2000

47

Montana Law Review, Vol. 61 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 7

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol61/iss1/7

48

